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Thomas, and Amie Thomasson.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L


















dent. Hume (1978 [1888], book 1, section 2, 191), in the Treatise, seems to 
suggest that subject-independence is never presented in perception:
as to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can 
never be an object of the senses; but any opinion we can form con-
















2.   See the essays in Van Gulick and Lepore 1991, part 4.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience





































3.   Something close to this claim is defended by Noë (2003).S U S A N N A  S I E G E L





































The central claim of this essay is that certain expectations are Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience






































telephone:S U S A N N A  S I E G E L








































of a telephone, the telephone will move with us, preventing us from get-Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience
























L, and the contents of the experience include that there is something fish-














this way, visual experiences are more like beliefs than like hopes in that S U S A N N A  S I E G E L







































give the contents of an experience must reflect its phenomenal character.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience









































subject-independent or perspectivally connected manner.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L
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which are neutral on whether the contents they propose are or are not structured.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience


































stands in to an object when the experience is an experience of perceiving the object.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L
366   






































in order for an experience to be veridical.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience









































main point, that the failure in the fish case is a failure of correctness, still holds.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L







































tured, a fortiori structured like a conjunct.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience






































where F is replaced with specific predicates.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L







































tations reflected in the conditionals.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience






































17.   See  Smith  2002,  chap.  5  for  a  discussion  of  experiences  traditionally  so 
classified.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L







































fireflies).Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience





































enal change is a representational change—a thesis known as representationalism. S U S A N N A  S I E G E L








































view that substitutes sense-data for public objects.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience






































in the text against the other negative complex content apply to this proposal as well.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L






































ited negative complex contents for the Odd experience and simple con-Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience








































that does not purport to represent it as extending forward or backward.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L







































a means of making vivid one way in which one might come to lose those expectations.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience








































background expectations seem to be sensitive to this fact.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L






































there is some third argumentative strategy that can settle the matter.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience







































these conditionals. In the next section, I will consider some other rea-S U S A N N A  S I E G E L





































does not support Searle’s view. If the arguments surrounding the doll Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience







































discussion, see sec. 6 of Siegel forthcoming.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L








































operate with less sophisticated varieties of self-consciousness and objectivity.Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience








































being object-involving.S U S A N N A  S I E G E L








































on in theorizing about what contents experiences of object-seeing have. Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience
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